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“The End of Faith?” Science and
Theology as Process
By Noreen Herzfeld

11
12

Abstract: A spate of recent books would claim that science’s only role vis a vis theology is to discredit it.
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Sam Harris, in The End of Faith, credits religious faith as the source of much of the violence in today’s
world. Richard Dawkins, in The God Delusion, views religion as, at best, a profound misunderstanding,
and at worst a form of madness. Both find an antidote to such irrationality in science. To Harris and
Dawkins religion is a body of accumulated knowledge. However, religion can also be thought of as a
process, one based on experience, questions, and results. One group that has systematized such a process
is the Society of Friends, or Quakers. The Quaker tradition shows that it is quite possible for religion
to rest on experience and questioning, and for these to form the basis for an active and involved faith,
one that need never reject science and its findings, but will temper their use with the best wisdom that
can be gained from personal and communal experience.
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A spate of recent books would claim that science’s
only role vis a vis theology is to discredit it. Sam
Harris, in The End of Faith, credits religious faith as
the source of much of the violence in today’s world.
Richard Dawkins, in The God Delusion, views religion as, at best, a profound misunderstanding, and
at worst a form of madness. Both find an antidote to such irrationality in science. To Harris and
Dawkins religion is a body of accumulated knowledge. This static view of religion sees no difference
between past and present. Harris writes, “While
religious people are not generally mad, their core
beliefs absolutely are. This is not surprising, since
most religions have merely canonized a few products of ancient ignorance and derangement and
passed them down to us as though they were primordial truths.”1 If religion is nothing but a body
of ancient, and generally erroneous, knowledge, science plays no real role, except that of spoiler.
Science has, at times, also been viewed as a body
of accumulated knowledge. The science most of us
encountered in high school consisted of learning the

periodic table, the names and attributes of the planets, the hierarchies of order, phylum, and species.
But in general, we consider science to be a process,
the scientific method. This characterization was evident in the December 2005 judgment in Dover
Pennsylvania against the inclusion of Intelligent
Design in high school biology classes. Intelligent
Design (ID) was recently rejected as a science on
several criteria, including the following: it cannot
be tested through experiment, it does not generate
new questions, and ID leads to no useful results in
the real world. All three of these criteria are dynamic, rather than static. They speak of ongoing
observation and experiment, of further unknowns,
of new and ever changing results.
In this light, what science brings to theology is
precisely this method. In a society that has embraced experiment and technology, innovation, and
change as a given, theology has two choices. On the
one hand, it can present religious thought as static,
one place in a world of change where change does
not occur. This is appealing to many, and provides

47
48
49

Noreen Herzfeld is Professor of Computer Science and Theology and Coordinator of the Koch Chair in Catholic Thought and Culture at St.
John’s University and the College of St. Benedict in Collegeville and St. Joseph, Minnesota. Her most recent book is In Our Image: Artificial
Intelligence and the Human Spirit (Fortress, 2002).

1

“The End of Faith?” Science and Theology as Process • Noreen Herzfeld

289

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

a partial reason for the rise of fundamentalism in
both the Christian West and the Muslim East. The
problem with this stance is that it is basically a lie.
A quick tour of Biblical or Quranic interpretation,
and of religious practice through history, shows that
neither interpretations of sacred texts nor religious
practices have ever been static.2
The other choice is for theology to be a fluid
as science, in fact, to adopt many of the same processes that characterize the scientific method. Such a
theology need not dismiss the accumulated knowledge of tradition or scripture, just as science does
not dismiss the large body of facts that have been
garnered through careful observation and experiment. However, the theories that rest on these facts
must be subject to change as new evidence emerges.
A healthy theology that takes science, and, indeed,
all other forms of rational inquiry, seriously must be
willing to alter its perspective when truth requires.
Can theology be this open to change? Is there an
example of a Christian theology as flexible as the
scientific method, one that meets the criteria of experiment, questions, and useful results of the Dover
ID trial?
As a graduate student and scientist, I found myself drawn to the Religious Society of Friends, the
Quakers, precisely because both their core beliefs
and their mode of worship are rooted in process.
Revelation, in Quakerism, is an ongoing process,
best encountered in the silence of meeting for worship. This view of theology as process is not unique
to Quakerism; one finds a similar grounding in
process in the mystical strains of most faiths, particularly in Zen Buddhism, Sufism, yoga, and the
writings of the Kabala. Even Pope Benedict XVI
(who is not noted for his mystical tendencies), in
the controversial speech “Faith, Reason, and the
University” delivered in Regensburg, notes that the
scientific ethos is “the will to be obedient to the
truth, and, as such, it embodies an attitude which
belongs to the essential decisions of the Christian
spirit.” But it is the Quaker tradition that, for me,
best exemplifies a faith that gives the lie to Harris’ and Dawkins’ characterization of religion, and
provides a model of a religion that honors a similar process as science. So let’s return to the criteria
of the Dover ID decision—experiment, new ques-

tions, and useful results—to see how these criteria
fit with the process of a Christian, and more specifically, Quaker theology.

Grounding in Experiment and
Observation
Quakers believe that one should live by the truth.
They take quite literally John 4:24: “God is spirit,
and those who worship him must worship in spirit
and truth.” This led the early Quakers away from
set prayers and creeds, to a mode of silent worship, in which one speaks only what one knows
inwardly, and otherwise waits for the inner truth
or light, the experience of God’s presence within.
God is thus defined not through creeds or even
scripture, but through an experimental process of
waiting in silence. As physicist and Quaker Arthur
Eddington notes, “The spirit of seeking which animates us refuses to regard any kind of creed as its
goal.”3
Here we have Christianity as process rather than
as body of knowledge. The inward revelation that
comes from seeking is not opposed to revelation
as handed down through scripture and tradition.
Quakers believe that both are different expressions
of a single reality. “Though we agree with our fellow Christians in this high esteem for the scriptures,
from the earliest days the Society of Friends has regarded them as the record of revelation rather than
the revelation itself, and has insisted that the scriptures be not substituted for the Spirit which gave
them forth or for Christ or for the Inner Light
to which they testify. They are not the primary
rule for faith and conduct.”4 This view of scripture
as a record of the human experience of revelation,
rather than as revelation itself, obviates Harris’ criticism that adherents to the monotheistic faiths must
either rely slavishly on a literal acceptance of scripture or must reject that scripture altogether. The
Quakers provide a middle way.
If scripture is not in itself revelation, what
is? Margaret Fell, one of the mothers of Quakerism recounts her first encounter with Quakerism’s
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founder, George Fox. “[He] said, ‘the scriptures
were the prophets’ words and Christ’s and the apostles’ words, and what as they spoke they enjoyed
and possessed and had it from the Lord.’ And said,
‘. . . You will say, Christ saith this, and the apostles
say this; but what canst thou say?’ . . . and then I
saw clearly we were all wrong . . . and I cried in
my spirit to the Lord, ‘We are all thieves, we are
all thieves, we have taken the Scriptures in words
and know nothing of them in ourselves.’”5 Religion,
like science, is best grounded in the knowledge
that comes from experience and experimentation,
not blind faith. For Quakers, the best source of
this knowledge is found in the experience of sitting
in silence, the silence of the mind and heart that
comes from sitting either alone or with others in
Meeting for Worship. This sitting is often described
as “waiting on the Lord” where waiting is used in
a dual sense. One indeed waits for something to
happen, for some clarity or experience of the Light
within. One also waits in the sense of attending
to God, to the exclusion of all other thoughts and
distractions. Sitting in the silence is an experiment,
and, although one knows the results others have
had, each experience is its own, and leads to its
own results.
However, scientists recognize that experimentation can sometimes give erroneous results. Acceptable results should be replicable by other
researchers, supported by the results found in
other laboratories. Quakers note the same necessity.
Before a Quaker makes a major decision, or in
times of confusion or change, it is suggested that
one consult a clearness committee. This is a group
of peers, who sit in silence with the consultant
seeking the truth together and then ask questions.
A clearness committee never supplies answers, only
questions designed to help shed light on the true
nature of the problem or decision.
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The questions of the clearness committee lead to
the second criterion science holds up for theology. Does a given theory or practice lead to further

questions and avenues of research? Kenneth Arnold
writes, “Contrary to what people of science and religion long believed, questions, not answers, are the
building blocks of the universe.”6 It is in the questions that both fields ask that we find much similarity, questions that include: Who are we? How
does the world work? How are we related to the
world around us? How are we related to one another? What are we to do to improve the lives of
ourselves or others? A good scientific theory may
provide an answer to one or more of these questions, but it should also lead to further questions
and further avenues of research. Ted Peters describes
this attribute of a scientific theory as its fertility.
Science begins with questions; the process of looking for answers should lead to further questions.
Quakers also begin with questions. These questions have been organized into sets called Queries,
which are read at meeting for worship at regular
intervals. Queries are the only thing that is mandated to be spoken aloud at meeting for worship.
They are meant to stimulate self-examination, by
both the individual and the meeting as a whole.
The following is a typical set of queries:
Do you live with simplicity, moderation,
and integrity? Are you punctual in keeping
promises, careful in speech, just and compassionate in all your dealings with others?
Do you take care that your spiritual growth
is not sacrificed to busyness but instead integrates your life’s activities?7

These questions cannot be answered once and for
all. They are questions one needs to ask over and
over throughout one’s life. Each one leads to further
questions. Thus, the spiritual life for the Quaker is
not one of answers but one that follows Rilke’s advice to a young poet to “be patient toward all that is
unsolved in your heart and try to love the questions
themselves, . . . Live the questions now. Perhaps you
will then gradually, without noticing it, live along
some distant day into the answer.”8
Questions extend beyond one’s own life to any
theory about the world or the divine. Explanations
in science or religion must always be tentative. The
provisional nature of scientific explanations has long
been accepted, particularly in a post-Kuhnian age.9
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In the realm of theology, physicist and theologian
Arthur Peacocke has argued that models in theology should be considered equally provisional.10 As
shockingly modern as this idea seems, Christianity
has a long tradition of wariness of theological models, as exemplified in the apophatic tradition, which
stresses the unknowability of God, describing what
God is not rather than what God is. The Greek
theologian Evagrius cautions us to “never define the
divine.”11 Gregory of Nyssa notes, “Concepts create idols. Only wonder comprehends anything.”12
This emphasis on the negative is also found in
Quakerism, which seems to be based on “a list of
negatives–no priests, no creeds, no sacraments, no
service–yet at the same time each negative rejects
a limitation; no one priest, for all are open to the
word of God; no defined creed, for each must find
his own way of expressing his own experience; no
sacramental rites, for all of life is sacramental; no
prearranged service, so that our Meeting is open
to God’s message.”13 Like the endless questions of
science, Quakerism is intrinsically open-ended because Quakers believe that they live in an openended universe. Their models of God and of the
world are inherently provisional, just as Peacocke
suggests.
Provisionality does not negate utility. Consider,
for example, one application of the Quaker devotion to the truth discussed above. Commitment to
the real, as known through experience, led the earliest Quakers to reject the visual arts, not through
any concern with their subject matter, but because
a painting is a substitute for the reality it seeks to
portray. Why not look at the real thing, they argued. Quakers have since realized that this was a
limited view and have changed their stance. Most
would now agree with Elfrida Foulds, who writes:
“The truth which the artist seeks and which he
expresses through his art is part of the Universal
Truth, just as the truth sought and expressed by
the philosopher and the scientist and the theologian is part of the Universal Truth.”14 However,
this change in the view of art does not negate the
underlying commitment to integrity. Thus Quakers
now question the virtual worlds of cyberspace and
computer games on the same grounds. One should
not deliberately choose illusion over reality.

Religion and Violence: A Case
Study
Of course Quakers also shun the violence that is
so endemic to the world of computer games. This
brings us back to Harris’ critique of religion. Harris
claims that religion, even moderate religion, poses a
genuine threat to our survival as a species through
it’s toleration of, in fact, avocation of violence.
He finds in religious belief the root of violence,
not only exemplified in past crusades, pogroms,
and inquisitions, but in most of the conflicts that
currently beset our world—in Palestine, Kosovo,
Northern Ireland, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Chechnya,
Sudan—the list goes on.15 Harris mentions, and
quickly dismisses, the pacifistic stance of Gandhi;
he notes in a footnote that each faith has produced
nonviolent contemplatives, though these are rare individuals.16
However, the Quakers have consistently taken a
non-violent stand, as a group. One of the strongest
testimonies of the Quakers, one which has set them
apart from most other Christians, has been the
peace testimony. Quakers generally reject all forms
of war and violence. This rejection stems from a
dual understanding of human nature. First, since
Quakers believe that “there is that of God in every
man” one attacks God himself when one attacks another human being. Second, Quakers believe in an
absolute equality of all persons that works against
violence. While pacifism might be seen as another
negation, the negation of war, it can also be seen as
a call to action. Quakers have acted tirelessly as mediators in conflict, and as promoters of economic
development, so as to head off conflict.
Do we have here a precept that is demanded of
all Quakers, regardless of their experience? Not at
all. In the 17th century it was part of the standard
dress of the English gentleman to wear a sword. After William Penn had become a Quaker he began
to feel uncomfortable with this accoutrement and
asked George Fox whether, as a Quaker, he must
stop wearing the sword. Fox’s reply was, “Friend
William, wear thy sword as long as thou canst.”
Thus, the Quaker devotion to integrity to one’s
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personal experience trumps the testimony to peace.
This was seen also in World War II, when some
young Quaker men chose to serve in the military. Though this choice was not condoned by the
larger community, it was allowed. The hope is that
eventually, one will live in “the virtue of that life
and power that [takes] away the occasion of all
wars.”17
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A theology rooted in the experiment of silent waiting and resting on questions rather than answers
could seem detached from the real world. The final criterion from the Dover trial reminds science
and theology that both have implications and responsibilities for how we live in the world.
We have long entertained a fiction that science
is morally neutral. According to Albert Einstein,
“Science can only ascertain what is, but not what
should be.”18 But science is more than the contemplative quest for insight into the structure and
mechanisms of the natural world. Philosopher Albert Borgman points out that science is valued in
our society precisely for its transformative power.
Thus, intrinsically coupled with its offspring, technology, science also seeks to improve the human
condition, and in doing so makes a series of value
judgments. Francis Bacon noted that the true aim
of science should be the mastery of nature and end
of suffering, to “the glory of the Creator and the
relief of man’s estate.”19 The relief of man’s estate
is a worthy goal. Yet many scientists have a hard
time accepting that there are limits to what we can
do, and more especially to what we should do. Yuval Levin, fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy
Center, notes, “‘We have bricks, so let us build
a tower,’ we say to one another in the scientific
age. We have ‘spare’ embryos, so let us make stem
cells. This has never been a very good argument
for building a tower, and it is not an adequate justification for destroying human embryos for stem
cells. But it has always been a hard argument to
resist.”20 Yet we do at times resist the possible. We
can often best see what it is we value by looking at

what we do; as Jesus said, “by their fruits, you will
know them” (Mat 7:20). A careful examination of
the technologies we pour our time and effort into
will tell us what we value.
Our scientific theories also change the way we
view ourselves and our world, thus altering the
framework that underlies the values we hold. For
example, Sherry Turkel’s study of human interaction
with computers shows the various ways in which
we have come to think of our selves and our own
thinking process in terms of computers. We can
think of our minds in terms of data processing,
indeed this vision may underlie the materialistic
understandings of the human beings such as Harris’s or Dawkins’. Yale professor, Paul Bloom writes,
“The great conflict between science and religion in
the last century was over evolutionary biology. In
this century, it will be over psychology, and the
stakes are nothing less than our souls.”21
The question of whether the qualities we consider to be part of our soul emerge from the biochemical processes of the brain or whether we even
have souls at all, underlies many, if not most of the
ethical issues that bedevil both scientists and politicians in this 21st century. Arguments over abortion
hinge on the question of when life begins, when a
new soul emerges. Debates over end of life treatments rest on the same question in reverse. Even
in my field—computer science—the question of an
emergent or a God given soul arises under the guise
of questions such as “Could an artificially intelligent computer have a soul? Could it think like
us? Should such a machine have rights? Is creating
such a machine hubris?” Thus our conception of
the soul, rooted in either science or religion, will
determine what we decide, as a society, to do in
these cases.

Conclusion: The End of Faith?
Harris writes, “It is time we recognized that the
only thing that permits human beings to collaborate with one another in a truly open-ended way
is their willingness to have their beliefs modified by new fact. Only openness to evidence and
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argument will secure a common world for us.” He
intends this as an indictment of religion, continuing, “The spirit of mutual inquiry is the very antithesis of religious faith.”22 He is both right and
wrong. Harris is indeed correct in his support for
beliefs that are open-ended; he is wrong to suppose that religious faith is necessarily inimical to
this process. The Quaker tradition shows that it is
quite possible for religion to rest on experience and
questioning, and for these to form the basis for an
active and involved faith, one that need never reject science and its findings, but will temper their
use with the best wisdom that can be gained from
personal and communal experience.
This is a model that theology in general could
benefit from. The publication of books such as
Harris’ and Dawkins’ and the wide acceptance of
their arguments pitting religion against reason, religion against science, should serve as a wake-up
call for mainstream Christianity and Islam. Religion in the twenty-first century must consider the
best of science, both as a body of knowledge and as
a process. Theology must find its roots once again
in experience, the same experience that was known
to our forbears in the faith. We must be flexible
enough to recognize when our models of creed or
code are rooted, not in that experience but in a
culture or tradition that no longer fits the present.
Theology must admit that our answers are provisional and that there will always be new questions
arising from our changing world.
Science, however, must do the same. Whenever
scientists make absolute truth claims, or act as if
their models are no longer provisional, they sink
into scientism, a dogmatism as dangerous as any religious dogmatism. Our scientific quest has given us
great power, power to heal and power to destroy.
In a nuclear world, a world facing global warming,
a world of easily hidden and transported explosives,
we cannot afford “the end of faith” that Harris suggests. Rather, we need, now more than ever, to wait

upon our creator and redeemer, in silence and trust,
for the “Light that enlightens everyone that comes
into the world” (John 1:9).
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